As policy makers seek to draw lessons from the growth of Chinese manufacturing, we need to better understand the evolving strategies adopted by Chinese manufacturers since the economic reforms of the 1980s. Focusing on the apparel and electronics sectors, we look at how Chinese manufacturers sought to move to higher value-adding parts of the supply chain in different ways during the period 2001-2011 and how their western OEMs responded. As a first step towards understanding the co-evolving strategies and tactics of Chinese contract manufacturers and western OEMs, we use a simple game-theoretic framework of contract manufacturer and OEM strategies to look at the actual tactics many Chinese contract manufacturers adopted. Our findings are that Chinese contract manufacturers ended up cooperating, competing, or co-opetiting (i.e., cooperating and competing at the same time) with western OEMs. Also, western OEMs used their position in the supply chain to devise countermeasures, possibly ending with win-win solutions for both sides.
Introduction
Economists and policy researchers (cf. Huang 2003) have looked into the question of the high rate of growth of Chinese manufacturing over the three decades from 1980 to 2010, which have seen China becoming the world's largest manufacturer as a country and one with the secondhighest GDP. Much of this work has focused on FDI flows into China as many western manufacturers (or brands) strove to avail the low cost and supportive government policies to establish contract manufacturing or their own facilities in China. However, this work generally applies only to the mid 1990s. A few scholars -cf. Deng (2004) , Warner et al (2004) , and Child and Rodrigues (2005) -look at a later decade, around 1995-2005 , to view FDI flows going out from China since about 2000 as a possible measure of Chinese manufacturing prowess. Part of such outgoing flows were motivated by securing raw material supplies in Africa and Asia, but much of it was also to be to 'enter higher value-added markets' (Child and Rodrigues, 2005) . Shenzhen-based contract manufacturer of lithium batteries for OEM customers such as Motorola and Nokia, has sought to establish its presence in the nascent US electric car market by raising $232 million funding from Warren Buffett. In 2008, BYD began to sell electric cars worldwide rather than only supplying batteries. The same year, Hangzhou's WanXiang, a contract manufacturer for automotive parts such as drive-shafts and mufflers for Ford and others, acquired Ford's driveshaft division and established its own research center in Illinois.
2 Post-2010, Chinese retailers such as Bosideng seek to establish their own brands in the west selling nonChinese goods to appeal not only to western consumers but also to appeal to Chinese customers as a brand well established in the west! There are other examples of outbound moves that involve Chinese contract manufacturers that were relatively unknown in the west earlier except to their western OEMs.
Haier, a Qingdao-based contract manufacturer of Mitsubishi refrigerators, established its own factory in South Carolina in 2006 and started selling its own brand of home appliances (refrigerators, dishwashers, wine coolers, etc.) in the US after failing to acquire Maytag for $1.3 billion in 2005 (cf. Palepu et al. 2006) . In 2011, Tianwei New Energy, a Chengdu based solar photovoltaic (PV) product manufacturer, established a new production plant in Idaho and began to sell its polysilicon materials, silicon wafers, PV cells, PV modules, and PV systems in the US.
In 2011, Wuhan-based Linuo Solar Energy acquired IBM chip facility in NY in August 2011 (SNT, 2011) .
Our work explores the idea of 'moving to higher value-added markets' as motivating manufacturing strategies for both Chinese manufacturers and their western counterparts, both of which we treat as part of the same "eco-system". As Chinese companies moved up the value chain during 2001-2011, western companies also responded appropriately. The strategies of Chinese manufacturers and those of western companies thus are co-evolving and this coevolution is something other emerging economies will seek to learn from in the coming years.
Indeed, it has been suggested that 'a co-evolutionary perspective would provide an appropriate analytical framework' in this context (Child and Rodrigues, 2005: p. 405) . As a first step, we use a single-stage game theoretic lens with co-opetition as one of the basic strategies given that Chinese manufacturing companies are suppliers as well as competitors to western companies.
In the absence of publicly available hard data on why Chinese and western companies' managers acted the way they did and when and how they made agreements, our approach is exploratory and we use using examples of tactics Chinese manufacturers and their western customers have taken as reported in the business press. We have focused on manufacturers in the electronics and apparel industries for our examples given the attention on these two sectors in the business press when it comes to Chinese manufacturing. First we propose a simple gametheoretic framework for the strategic interactions between contract manufacturers and their western OEMs. We use this framework to examine the strategies and the specific ways these strategies have been operationalized by companies on either side. Part of the framework is the use of the concept of co-opetition (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996) whereby Chinese contract manufacturers and their western original equipment manufacturers (OEM) may co-operate and compete simultaneously. We use examples from the business press to support the existence of these strategies and counter-strategies. 3 Moreover, we show specific tactics that Chinese contract manufacturers are taking to operationalize their strategies as well as those that OEMs are taking or at least can take. We find that Chinese contract manufacturers have used co-operation, competition, or co-opetition (i.e., co-operating and competing at the same time) in the supply chain with their western OEMs.
Our contribution is twofold: First, we add to the management literature on the development of a coherent, cumulative body of knowledge regarding China's manufacturing practice especially over 2001-2011 during which outbound FDI has grown as the focus of Chinese manufacturing has shifted away from simply providing low cost contract manufacturing.
Doing so may shed further light on research on Chinese manufacturers; e.g., in explaining the managers' priorities (Li, 2000 : Table III ). Second, we introduce an application of co-opetition in a simple game-theoretic framework for supply chain management as a first step to understanding industry behavior in the context of co-evolving strategies of manufacturers and their customers.
We thus add to the surprisingly short list of articles that consider co-opetition in the supply chain (cf. Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009 and Gurnani et al. 2007 ).
Our work has managerial implications, not only for policy makers to understand behavior of companies in a supply chain, but also for managers of contract manufacturers and of OEMs as regarding tactics and counter-tactics, thus complementing the practitioner literature on this topic (cf. Arruñada and Vázquez 2006) . Moreover, a view of co-evolution is important in addressing concerns among western manufacturers and policy makers as reflected in such headlines as "China buys the world" and "Dangers of a rising China" in the western business press that reflect concern among western manufacturers and policy makers about China's and Chinese companies' growing economic power (Economist, 2005 (Economist, , 2010a (Economist, , 2010b . 3 We also include some manufacturing plants of western companies in China as well as some other companies in Asia (but not Japan) to gather specific tactics of companies in the same context.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides two motivating examples that show a rather different type of manufacturer than one would expect from the low-cost manufacturers of the 1980s and early 1990s. Next we discuss the theory underlying our view of co-evolving buyers and sellers, i.e., co-opetition in Section 3. Section 4 presents the strategic interactions specifically for Chinese contract manufacturers and their OEM customers. Sections 5 and 6 describe the strategies Chinese contract manufacturers and their western OEM customers respectively could take. We then use examples from the consumer electronic and apparel sectors to see what specific tactics these companies have taken and we link these tactics to the different strategies. We conclude in Section 7 with some research questions.
Motivating Examples: Galanz and Huawei
A successful electronic industry manufacturer is the Galanz Group, moving from textiles to electric appliances in 1992. Galanz has since become the world's biggest producer of microwave starting with only 10,000 microwaves a year and rising rapidly since to six million in 1999 and over 25 million in 2007.
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Since 1992, Galanz's manufacturing strategy has evolved rapidly while banking on the company's low cost advantage. In 1993, Galanz made a deal with Toshiba of Japan for producing Toshiba microwave ovens, and eventually, moving up the value chain, Galanz purchased the microwave division from Toshiba, leaving Toshiba with a 10 percent stake.
In 2007, Galanz held about 40 percent of the world market. To further grow revenues, Galanz also launched air conditioners and other house appliances. Consequently, the extensive trading with more than a hundred countries and regions in the world increased company's total output to RMB18 billion, along with its import and export, which amounted about US $1 billion Lenovo have changed rapidly and grown leaps and bounds over the last decade. This is hardly the case of manufacturers whose main strategy is competing on low cost.
Underlying Theory
As a first step towards understanding the co-evolution of Chinese contract manufacturers and their western OEMs, we have viewed their strategies (and associated tactics) through the lens of game theory. Researchers have applied game theory in many different supply-chain settings, in particular among buyers and sellers (Cachon and Netessine 1998 In contrast to traditional understanding of strategic interactions of co-operation and competition, Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) present the notion of co-opetition whereby firms co-operate and compete simultaneously. Instead of the traditional zero sum noncooperative games, they argue that co-opetition can lead to a "plus sum" game in which the total value created by co-petition is larger than without it but still needs to be divided among the players. Despite the natural fit of co-opetition to understand and analyze supply chains, the concept has not been brought into the broad supply chain literature.
Within a supply chain, a supplier and a buyer compete "vertically" in a zero-sum game as regards price. However, they also cooperate in that the buyer cannot sell any product unless the supplier provides the product or component. Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2009) provide an example of such co-opetition in the face of supply chain disruption. Gurnani et al. (2007) provide a different example of co-opetition in the following sense: (a) the supplier and retailer co-operate to increase the underlying demand by improving product quality and increasing sales effort;
respectively; and (b) the supplier and retailer engage in vertical competition: the supplier sets the wholesale price and the retailer sets the retail price.
Although co-opetition has not been studied thoroughly within the supply chain literature, Citroen for producing electric cars for the China market (Jing 2011) .
To help companies understand a broader game-theoretic perspective than competition (vertical or horizontal) or cooperation alone, Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) introduce the concept of a value net (Figure 1 ) whereby any company can engage in co-opetition with four different categories of 'players': customers, suppliers, competitors and 'complementors'. 6 A competitor, from the perspective of a customer (or a supplier), is a player that causes the decrease in the value of the company's products when the customer (supplier) buys from (sells to) the competitor. Likewise, a complementor, from the perspective of a customer (or supplier), is a player that causes the increase in the value of the company's offerings when the customer (supplier) buys from (sells to) the complementor (e.g., the "iPhone/iPad app" developers are complementors to Apple's tablet market). Moreover, not only do all links potentially have simultaneous elements of cooperation as well as competition, thus co-opetition, but also any single player can play multiple roles, for instance, a supplier like Samsung may also be a (horizontal) competitor to Apple (Figure 1 ).
6 With co-opetition is the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition, we distinguish it from cooperation and competition when the latter are not present simultaneously to highlight the difference between the three concepts. (1) High Market Risks: Because the contract manufacturing industry tends to compete on labor pool and (low) labor cost, the entry barrier for new entrants located in different regions was relatively low especially when government controls were regional. As more contract manufacturers provide similar services in China, price competition becomes fierce especially when information (products, price, etc.) about different contract manufacturers in China became accessible to western companies via online portals such as Alibaba. Unless the demand for these contract manufacturers continued to grow, the profit margin would continue to decline. Ultimately, price competition would force some contract manufacturers out of the market. 7 Throughout this paper, we refer to contract manufacturers as those Chinese owned contract manufacturers or foreign owned contract manufacturers with most of their offshored manufacturing facilities in China.
Competitors
(3) High Demand Risks: Not having direct access to consumers or even retailers, contract manufacturers depended on the OEMs for forecasted demand as well as consumer trends. Without supply chain visibility, contract manufacturers were susceptible to being saddled with inventory when end-customer demand decreases.
(4) High Supply Risks. As the demand in emerging market surged, the supply of raw materials fell short resulting in increased prices. For instance, as car sales rose by 25% in China in 2010, the price of rubber and palladium went up by 74% and 39%
respectively. Due to contractual agreements, contract manufacturers were not always able to pass on the price increase to their OEM customers, thus seeing their profit margins reduce. The risks faced by contract manufacturers along with the low margins may help understand the particular pressure these manufacturers were under. Specifically, after implementing various cost reduction initiatives, these contract manufacturers tried to create and capture value in the supply chain in order to survive (Zhai et al. 2007 ). Many Chinese contract manufacturers undertook quality-improvement initiatives (Robb and Although some of the investment was doubtless for securing energy as a resource, many deals were announced that would give Chinese manufacturers a brand overseas, thus allowing them to move up the value chain by selling directly to end-customers and consumers (Table 1) . Rather than analyzing this strategic game for a specific setting to determine the equilibrium strategies, given our goal of taking a first step towards co-evolution, we seek to show that co-operation, competition, and co-opetition are potential "equilibria" of the strategic game played by the contract manufacturer and the OEM customer. We do so by using industry examples to illustrate a simple game-theoretic framework. For instance, let us consider the case when the contract manufacturer selects CM Strategy 1 by extracting more value from the OEM, and the OEM selects OEM Strategy 1 by aligning with contract manufacturer in equilibrium so that both firms end up cooperating with each other. Similarly, when the contract manufacturer selects CM Strategy 2 by seeking other OEMs as customers, and the OEM deploys OEM Strategy 2 by seeking other contract manufacturers, both firms end up competing with each other.
Finally, when the contract manufacturer selects CM Strategy 3 by selling directly to end customers and the OEM select OEM Strategy 3 by defending its own turf that depends on the product category or geographical market, both firms engage in simultaneous competition and cooperation, thus co-petition (Table 2) . With this framework (Table 2) Keeping in mind these strategies of the contract manufacturers (Table 2) , we now consider the specific tactics that Chinese contract manufacturers have adopted. Here are examples of tactics from the apparel and electronics industries:
Contract

CM Tactic 1: Develop intimate knowledge about end-customers
Being far removed from the end-customers of the products they produced for their OEM customers, contract manufacturers sought to obtain in-depth knowledge about end-customers ( Figure 2 ). They had little experience in distributing products or managing retail operations in western countries. Without this knowledge, contract manufacturers could neither sell their own designs with credibility to potential OEM customers nor plan their production efficiently.
Therefore, they sought to develop first-hand knowledge about the end-customers. (Huang, 2010) .
CM Tactic 2: Increase visibility to consumer
To improve bargaining power with their OEM customers, contract manufacturers developed ways to ensure that end-customers or consumers were made aware of their products just as the "Intel Inside" campaign sought to create enough consumer awareness so that consumers would specifically ask vendors for Intel chips in their computers.
While the standard practice is to remain in the shadow of the OEM, contract manufacturers are increasingly asking their key OEM customers to display their names to create consumer awareness of the contract manufacturer. Shunde-based Galanz, discussed in Section 2, started printing the label 'Made by Galanz' on all the microwaves it produced for OEMs (Child and Rodrigues, 2005 In the medical device industry, western OEMs could not outsource their design work completely, but appropriately-certified contract manufacturers sought to collaborate with these OEMSs to reduce development time and cost (Harris, 2007) . Healthcare was a burgeoning market in 2001-2011 and electronics contract manufacturers found emerging product categories such as cardiac rhythm management (CRD) and remote patient monitoring, respiratory and anaesthesia machines. They also sought to make end-user medical devices such as cardiac rhythm management (CRD) and remote patient monitoring, respiratory and anaesthesia machines expected to grow as a category well beyond 2010 (Harris, 2007) . 
CM Tactic 4: Invest in R&D
To gain bargaining power, contract manufacturers invested heavily in R&D capabilities as we have already seen from the two case studies in Section 2. Using this capability, contract manufacturers developed new products for new markets or develop new product designs that use cheaper raw materials. Some contract manufacturers began to outsource not only design but also R&D. Stan Shih, founder of Taiwan's computer-maker Acer, has noted that contract manufacturers had been steadily increasing their R&D capabilities (Wei, 2009 Besides steady growth in revenue from $468 million in 1999 to $588 in 2007, Esquel has enjoyed a higher gross margin of 23.6% and an operating margin of 7.1%, substantially higher than that of competitors such as Luen Thai (Peleg-Gillai, 2007) .
CM Tactic 5: Think green
In the United States, the GreenCert designation (www. By examining the value created by different tactics as stated above, we can summarize how these actual tactics support those three posited strategies adopted by various Chinese contract manufacturers (Table 3) . 
Posited Strategies for the OEMs and Actual Tactics
Because OEMs and contract manufacturing belong to the same ecosystem that includes consumers and other end-customers, we must look at the tactics of western OEMs so as to understand the tactics of Chinese contract manufacturers. Certainly, OEMs could recognize the tactics for their Chinese contract manufacturers and react to operationalize strategies of their own to generate profits for themselves.
Understanding their contract manufacturers' strategies is useful for the OEMs to develop counter-strategies by exploiting their position at the front of the supply chain. Only by doing so can they ensure that the contract manufacturer's tactics are in line with the OEM's interests.
However, if this is not possible, then the OEM could use its position to defend its turf and/or seek compromise. In this section, we first describe these counter strategies (Table 2 ) with some supporting evidence in the consumer electronic and apparel sectors. Then we look at the tactics from the business press as we did with contract manufacturers to see how the actual tactics fit these strategies.
Here are the three posited strategies:
OEM Strategy 1: Align with key contract manufacturers
When the contract manufacturer's strategy is to extract more value from the OEM, the OEMs focused on furthering their branding through marketing and other means. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Chang'an automotive expanded its capability to produce electric cars as a contract manufacturer (CM Tactic 5 under CM Strategy 1), its California based OEM customer Coda focused on branding and marketing.
At the same time, OEMs can seek new product categories as well as (geographical) markets and whether or not to involve the contract manufacturer in these efforts. It could also outsource more functions, e.g., design, to the contract manufacturer. The OEM could also share end-customer experience with the products that the contract manufacturer is making along with whatever sales information it can comfortably share. Thus, the counter-strategy here is to align the contract manufacturer's tactics to the OEM's own revenue growth so as to achieve a win-win solution. For example, as Daphne produces and distributes various Nike products in China, Nike is trying to double its sales in China by marketing its products as a fashion brand instead of sports brand. This may be because apparently most Chinese do not have a western-style passion for working out (Burkitt, 2010) .
OEM Strategy 2: Balance bargaining power with contract manufacturers
When the contract manufacturer seeks to add other OEMs, if these other OEMs are in the same product categories, then the OEM must either seek other contract manufacturers or insist on processes to ensure confidentiality. Although Flextronics serves different OEMs in certain product categories; these OEMs get separate management teams, engineers, assembly workers, and production lines in different locations. If these other OEMs are in product categories that the OEM currently does not have, then there may be an opportunity for the OEM to get into these new product categories itself with the contract manufacturer's help.
OEM Strategy 3: Establish clear market boundaries with contract manufacturers
When the contract manufacturer's strategy seeks to sell directly to end-customers, the OEM must distinguish between whether the end-customers are for existing product categories or different and for the same (geographical) markets or different. For existing product categories in existing markets, the OEM has to protect its turf as it would with any competitor. However, in other cases, the OEM has to consider the costs of entering these product categories or markets and whether or not it could leverage the contract manufacturer's experience (e.g., the Chang'an-PSA partnership for producing and selling electric cars in China). The OEM could also come to an understanding with the contract manufacturer about turf boundaries in dividing up these new product categories or markets. For example, although Esquel does sell its own brand of cotton shirts in its PYE stores and Daphne sells its own brand of shoes in its Shoebox stores in China, their customers are in a different segment than those of its western OEMs (Hugo Boss, Brooks Brothers, etc. for Esquel, and Born, Nike, Adidas, etc. for Daphne).
Now we examine the specific tactics that OEMs have actual taken insofar as we can gather from the business press and which we then link with the above OEM strategies.
OEM Tactic 1: Leverage existing brand to expand product categories
OEMs leveraged their existing brand value to expand their product categories to capture new markets and pre-empt potential new entries. In the consumer electronics industry, as many contract manufacturers acquire the capability to produce and sell various MP3 players, California-based Apple has leveraged its brand image to expand its product categories from iPod to iPhone to iPad and AppleTV. Apple has rolled out its iPhone, iPhone 3G, iPhone 3Gs, and iPhone 4 within short succession to continue engaging with the end customers. In the apparel industry, Adidas ventured into body care products (body wash, cologne, shampoo, etc.) and watches by leveraging its strong brand image in sports wear. This created major challenges not only for Apple's competitors, but also for its contract manufacturers that may have sought to sell their own brands of products directly to retailers or consumers.
OEM Tactic 2: Bundle product and customer services
The OEMs are closer to the consumer than their Chinese contract manufacturers. Some OEMs custom tailored jeans at Levi's stores, suits at Ralph Lauren's stores, and shirts at Nordstrom.
OEM Tactic 3: Invest in innovation
Developing innovative products and services is a good idea for any company, but doing so also ensures the contract manufacturer's loyalty. It also fends off any potential competition including that from any other OEM that the contract manufacturer may wish to work with or even from the contract manufacturer interested in reaching out to end-customers.
A late entrant to the mobile phone market, Apple developed the "App Store" to enable external developers to post their apps on this virtual retail store under a revenue-sharing scheme.
This enabled Apple to offer over 300,000 applications quickly and cheaply in 2010, creating major challenges for competitors and any OEM ambitions into the end-user market. Nike 
OEM Tactic 5: Form vertical partnerships with contract manufacturers
OEMs seek to partner with their contract manufacturers to prevent them to become direct competitors. In the electronics industry, various OEM computer companies partnered with Intel to market their "Intel inside" computers. After a failed attempt to launch its own smartphones, 
Conclusions
In seeking to answer the question of why Chinese manufacturing has taken off at a much more rapid pace than in the west since the late 1980s, we have restricted ourselves to the more recent and less studied period of 2001-2011 and, in particular, to the electronics and the apparel sectors.
The significance of this period is the pre-eminence of outward FDI flows from China, as Chinese companies sought higher value-adding markets abroad rather than simply be content to be lowcost suppliers to western OEMs. Such a move may have come from necessity: the risks faced by contract manufacturers along with the low margins pressured these contract manufacturers to develop basic strategies to seek value in the supply chain.
We have taken the view that, being part of the same eco-system, Chinese contract manufacturers and their western OEMs have co-evolved rather than the former simply supplanting the latter. To better understand this co-evolution, we first presented a simple gametheoretic framework positing generic strategies of contract manufacturers and those of their western OEMs. Next we provided industry examples of tactics specific companies have taken and showed the links of these tactics to the posited strategies via Table 3 for contract manufacturers and via Table 4 for OEMs. Thus, by examining the tactics taken by the OEMs and their linkages with the underlying counter-strategies, we have established the existence of strategic interactions between the Chinese contract manufacturers and their OEM customers as described in Table 2 .
From a policy perspective, the tactics taken by the Chinese contract manufacturers suggest their revenue-enhancing strategies are intended to add value and to extract more value from their existing customers, while adding more OEM and more end-customers to their roster (Table 3) . We have thus argued their tactics stem from their position in the supply chain, not because of any conspiracy as is sometimes hinted by policy makers. Indeed, OEMs are not helpless: they too have taken advantage of their position in the supply chain and we have outlined possible counter-strategies as well as specific tactics that OEMs can take and have taken.
Given our qualitative approach, while we have not established the equilibrium that is based on a specific context in this strategic game, we have shown that the strategies adopted by the contract manufactures and the potential strategies that OEMs can consider adopting result in games based on co-operation, competition, or co-opetition. Moreover, we have shown that supply-chain co-opetition is a good way to understand industry behavior with our application to Chinese contract manufacturing for the apparel and the electronics industry sectors.
The co-existence of all three strategic interactions (co-operation, competition, or coopetition) raises the following questions as possible future research and policy topics, not just for
Chinese contract manufacturers but also for those in other emerging economies:
1. How do we further this work for 'an appropriate analytical framework' for a coevolutionary perspective?
2. Does the co-evolution between Chinese contract manufacturers' tactics and their western OEMs' stimulate innovation?
3. With both Chinese manufacturers and western ones having co-evolved over the past three decades, does it make sense for policy makers in India and other emerging economies to simply emulate Chinese manufacturing policies formulated in the 1990s?
4. Would the Chinese contract manufacturers become more vulnerable with rapidly rising labour cost (and resulting labour dissatisfaction or even unrest) in China and when the renmimbi is likely to increase value in the foreseeable future against the US dollar and other major western currencies? On the flip side, as western OEMs become even more asset "light", will they have an upper hand in becoming even more profitable by becoming more flexible in terms of products, markets, etc.?
5. As Chinese contract manufacturers and western OEMs take different tactics to sustain their profitable growth, what would be the steady-state outcome of the interplays between the contract manufacturers and their OEMs?
6. As more Chinese contract manufacturers develop and sell their own brands of products in certain markets, can they continue to act as contract manufacturers and as
OEMs without spinning off OEM companies like Acer and BanQ? Should OEMs' enter into co-petition arrangements upfront with their contract manufacturers or should they establish no-compete clauses with their contract manufacturers?
7. If the unemployment rates continue to stay high in the western countries will such policy tactics like increasing import tax for products made in China help the economy in western countries, say by triggering more Chinese manufacturers to set up production operations in western countries in the same way as the Japanese manufacturers did in the 1980s?
Ultimately, as OEMs continue to outsource their operations, the strategic interactions and tactics of (Chinese) contract manufacturers and their (western) OEM customers continue to provide an exciting research area. Moreover, as focus moves on manufacturing in other emerging economies like India and Brazil to advance economic development, studying
China from such a perspective may be much more fruitful than in static terms of past policies.
